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Introduction 
After nearly twenty-five years of relatively high oil revenues, Saudi Arabia 
and the other economies of the Gulf States remain overwhelmingly domi-
nated by revenues from this source. In addition, while considerable 
industrial diversification into non-oil sectors has been achieved, the results 
have largely been below expectations. Consequently, it is not apparent that 
the non-oil sectors can sustain growth and development without a steady 
infusion of government expenditur~s. 1 Specifically, lower oil prices have 
resulted in falling state revenues and consequent reduced spending on infras-
tructure and industry. This, in turn, has exacerbated social unrest. At the 
same time, increased military spending by Iran and Iraq is also forcing the 
country to expand its allocations to the military. 
On a more fundamental level, it might be argued that beginning in the 
mid-1980s the decline in oil revenues and their increased instability affected 
the path of development. For example, Ghamdi presents strong evidence 
that Saudi government consumption and investment expenditures experi-
enced instability that was positively related to the instability of total 
revenue. 2 However, the effect was more marked for development expendi-
ture, which supports the view that revenue instability did have an impact on 
the country's goals of development. 
While it does not question this assertion, the research below focuses on a 
somewhat different issue. That is, has the actual mechanism underlying 
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economic growth in the kingdom fundamentally changed or has the old 
model simply run into a period of diminishing returns? 
Overview 
During the oil-boom years Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states' economies were characterized by: 
• a lack of binding budgetary constraints, which, in turn, reduced and 
sometimes even eliminated the need to set spending priorities and allo-
cate scarce economic resources; 
• financial resources so large that even with a highly skewed income 
distribution all sectors of society saw some measure of improvement in 
their standard of living; 
• a situation in which unemployment was unimaginable, since govern-
ments showed a seemingly infinite capacity to hire both citizens and 
foreigners in public jobs.3 
The oil boom created a lasting legacy, which is now stifling growth and 
development in the region. It created a parallel escape from politics in which 
ruling elites rarely faced the need to share power, renew their legitimacy and 
credibility, or tolerate any meaningful public debate on major economic, 
social, or political issues such as oil and budgetary policy. It also brought 
about a system which had neither taxation nor representation. And perhaps 
the greatest burden imposed by the oil-boom years was an illusion that the 
oil bonanza would last indefinitely. 
All this has resulted in governments being slow to adapt to the new reality of 
lower revenues. For example, many of the Gulf governments have run chronic 
deficits averaging well in excess of 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 
and reaching 15 percent in Saudi Arabia; and budget shortfalls have been 
almost entirely reflected in the external accounts, leading to large current-
account deficits. In addition, external and domestic deficits were initially 
financed by drawing down the substantial foreign resources accumulated 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, with the exception of the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), most Gulf countries depleted their assets and turned to 
borrowing, and, in doing so, for the first time exposed their economies and 
economic policies to serious international scrutiny. Most of these governments 
have finally responded by reducing spending; Saudi Arabia has made major 
reductions in expenditure and increased many fees for services. 
turrent problems 
The Saudi population is growing rapidly. According to UN projections, 
population growth will average 3.5 percent per annum until 2002. Some 60 
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percent of the population is less than 24 years old, and the 15-24 age group 
is the fastest-growing in the country. Even economic growth of 3.8 percent 
per annum, as is expected under the new five-year plan, will barely generate 
enough jobs for a labor force expanding at these rates. In addition, some fear 
that employment levels could actually fall because of technological advances 
and increasingly capital-intensive investment. This would leave a rising 
number of young nationals chasing even fewer jobs. 
Government finance 
Public-sector employment has become a means of disguising unemploy-
ment, and government jobs are still seen as having high status. 
Unemployment is also a serious problem. Nevertheless, low oil prices have 
put increased strain on Saudi government finances. With wages and salaries 
accounting for almost 50 percent of government spending, rationalization 
has become unavoidable. However, this is unlikely to mean redundancies. 
Instead, the government will rely on natural attrition, in combination with 
a freeze on new recruitment, to cut its wage bill. 
Dependency 
Bringing in expatriate workers has been a major factor in Saudi Arabia's 
economic development. The government now feels that the economic and 
fiscal costs are growing too fast and without commensurate benefits. Foreign 
workers are a major burden on the state's finances - like everyone else in 
Saudi Arabia, they are not liable for income or sales tax. However, they do 
enjoy free government services, in particular free health care. In addition, 
foreign workers in the kingdom sent home almost $16 billion in earnings in 
1993, thereby contributing to a current-account deficit of $14.2 billion 
(equivalent to around 15 percent of GDP). 
The authorities recognize that preventive action is needed if these prob-
lems are not to worsen. Thus the new development plan sets out measures to 
increase job opportunities for Saudi nationals. This may mean restrictions on 
the recruitment of expatriates into skilled and semi-skilled jobs. The 
government may also publish "targets" for private-sector companies, while 
tying government financing to progress on Saudiization. These measures are 
hardly draconian, and it is clear that pressure on the government to create 
jobs is less severe than in neighboring countries, where unemployment is 
more of a problem. Saudi Arabia will therefore persist in its cautious 
approach to "localization" - the minister of health said recently that it 
would take at least forty-seven years to get Saudis into only 62 percent of 
jobs in the Saudi Arabia health sector . 
• 
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Saudi Arabian growth patterns 
Another way of identifying some of the problems currently facing the Saudi 
authorities is by examining the changes in several key macroeconomic rela-
tionships during the 1980s and into the 1990s. The following points 
provide a brief overview of these relationships: 
• Government investment as a share of non-oil GDP has declined dramat-
ically since 1979, a pattern that also appears to be associated with the 
government's fiscal deficits. 
• On the other hand, private investment has retained a stable share of 
non-oil GDP, although it is experiencing a slight downward trend. 
• The fiscal-deficit share of non-oil GDP peaked in 1987, and after that 
date stabilized somewhat with regard to its share of non-oil GDP. 
• As has its investment, the public sector's consumption has declined with 
regard to its share of non-oil GDP. 
• Also as has investment, government consumption has shown a slight 
tendency in recent years to increase its share of non-oil GDP. 
• Private consumption has also experienced a gradual decline with regard 
to non-oil GDP. This expenditure category appears to be stabilizing at 
slightly over 60 percent of non-oil GDP. 
• As with consumption and investment, both private- and public-sector 
expenditures have fallen with regard to the country's non-oil GDP. 
• The decline in private-sector expenditures has been more stable, with 
public-sector expenditures experiencing much greater fluctuation. 
• The decline in public-sector expenditures (as indicated by its trend) has 
also been somewhat sharper than in the case of private expenditures. 
• GDP associated with the oil sector has shown the greatest fluctuation of 
all, falling below non-oil GDP for the first time in 1983. Since that date 
oil GDP seems to be stabilizing at somewhere between 40 and 60 
percent of non-oil GDP. 
• Private consumption has consistently accounted for a higher share of 
GDP than government consumption. However, in recent years this gap 
has narrowed somewhat. 
• On the other hand, government investment and private investment have 
changed places in accounting for the greatest share of GDP. Up to1985 
government investment had the larger share, private investment had the 
larger share during most of the rest of the 1980s, with government 
again taking the larger share in the 1990s. 
• Regime expenditure's share of GDP has experienced a downward trend, 
although this has been reversed in the last several years. 
• During the last several yeilrs public expenditures have accounted for a 
larger share of GDP than that associated with private expenditures. 
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• Of the aggregates examined here, investment has shown the most 
stability in terms of its share of GDP. 
• Capital formation has averaged around 20 percent of GDP and has expe-
rienced a very slight downward trend since 1979. 
• Consumption has been volatile, although it appears to be stabilizing at 
around 75 percent of GDP. 
While these patterns are valuable in describing certain changes that are 
taking place in Saudi Arabia, they are of less use in identifying whether the 
country's economic mechanisms have undergone fundamental alteration. 
The unanswered question is whether the links between government expen-
diture, the private sector, and the non-oil economy have changed in a way 
that alters the effectiveness of the regime's ability to manage the economy. 
Causal links 
To answer this question one must satisfactorily address the issue of 
causation. In this regard, several statistical tests using regression analysis 
for this purpose are gaining wider acceptance. The original and most 
widely used causality test was developed by Granger.4 According to this 
test, some economic variable such as government investment causes (say) 
growth in non-oil GDP if rates of expansion in non-oil GDP can be 
predicted more accurately by past values of government investment than 
by past rates of growth in non-oil GDP. To be certain that causality 
runs from government investment to non-oil GDP, past values of 
government investment must also be more accurate than past values of 
non-oil GDP in predicting the observed rates of growth in state invest-
ment over time. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of 
lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the 
omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than 
the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be 
inefficient. While it is possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary 
partial autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason to assume equal 
lag lengths for all types of economic activity. To overcome the difficulties 
noted above, the authors used the Hsaio5 method to identify the optimal 
lags.6 
In our example of government investment and non-oil GDP, several 
patterns are possible: 
1 Government investment causes non-oil GDP when the prediction error for 
non-oil GDP decreases when government investment is included in the 
growth equation. In addition, when non-oil GDP is added to the manu-
facturing equation the final prediction error should increase. 
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2 Non-oil GDP growth causes growth in government investment when the 
prediction error for non-oil GDP increases when government invest-
ment is added to the regression equation for non-oil GDP, and is 
reduced when non-oil GDP is added to the regression equation for 
government investment. 
3 Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases when govern-
ment investment is added to the non-oil GDP equation, and the final 
prediction error decreases. when non-oil GDP growth is added to the 
government investment equation. 
4 No relationship exists when the final prediction error increases both when 
government investment is added to the non-oil GDP growth equation 
and when non-oil GDP growth is added to the government investment 
growth equation. 
The data used for the causality tests cover the period 1970-92 (the last 
year for which comparable data were available); they were from the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Reports and were deflated by the non-oil 
GDP deflator. Causality relationships were examined for the following pairs 
of variables: 
• Private investment and (1) non-infrastructural investment, (2) infrastruc-
ture investment; (3) defense expenditures, (4) government consumption, 
(5) private consumption, and (6) non-oil GDP. 
• Non-oil GDP and (1) non-infrastructural investment, (2) infrastructure 
investment, (3) defense expenditures, (4) government consumption, and 
(5) private consumption. 
Prior to the actual causality analysis, several tests were performed to 
determine whether any of the pair of variables had undergone a structural 
shift during the period examined (1970-92). For most sets of variables a 
distinct shift in their relationship occurred between 1980 and 1982. The 
causality tests were therefore performed using the subgroupings 1970-82 
and 1980-92. 
Summing up, the main questions of interest are as follows: 
• What macroeconomic linkages characterize the Saudi economy? 
• To what extent have government expenditures provided a positive stim-
ulus to the private sector? 
• Have these linkages changed over time? 
• Is the private sector evolving in such a way that it may be ready to 
replace oil-based government expenditure as the engine of growth? 
• Is the linkage between public expenditure and private investment 
strengthening or weakening? 
• What are the major implications for future government policy? 
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Results 
The analysis found a number of interesting relationships for both sets of 
subperiods. It was found that several patterns characterize the first period 
(1970-82). Most important for longer run growth is the link between 
private investment and non-oil GDP. During this period private investment 
had a positive impact on non-oil GDP. This relationship was not particularly 
strong, but it did indicate that the private sector's activities were flowing 
into productive ventures. During this first period it was also found that 
private investment itself was mainly stimulated by defense expenditures, 
non-infrastructural investment. Government consumption and infrastruc-
tural investment provided considerably less of a stimulus to private 
investment. In addition, non-oil GDP received its strongest stimulus from 
government cons.umption during this period, followed by defense expendi-
tures. Ironically infrastructural investment had a negative impact on the 
growth in non-oil GDP. In addition, several distinct changes took place 
during this time. First, and most important, was the severing of the link 
between private investment and non-oil GDP. Second, non-oil GDP was no 
longer simulated by defense expenditures or government consumption. 
Third, the only macro variable that had a statistically significant link with 
non-oil GDP was non-infrastructural investment, and this link was rather 
weak. Fourth, private investment's link with defense expenditures weakened 
during this period, but was still positive. In contrast, the stimulus provided 
by government consumption strengthened during this period. On the other 
hand, the earlier stimulus provided by non-infrastructural investment 
shifted to a negative impact. Another major change from the earlier period 
was the shift from private-sector investment affecting private consumption 
to that of private consumption providing a stimulus to private investment. 
A comprehensive explanation of the causes for the apparent shifts in Saudi 
Arabia's growth mechanism is beyond the scope of this study. However, 
recent developments in statistical analysis have resulted in the development 
of new methods (largely cointegration analysis) for identifying the manner 
in which variables interact over long and short periods. 7 Several of these 
patterns are suggestive of possible factors that may be affecting the country's 
growth mechanism. The following sections apply this methodology to two 
areas often cited as being responsible for many of the kingdom's current 
economic difficulties, excessive defense expenditures, and the acceleration of 
remittance payments. 
Defense expenditures 
Defense expenditures in the kingdom account for around one-third of the 
government's budgetary allocations. While there is no doubt that the 
country can afford a high level of defense expenditures, the issue here is 
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whether these allocations come at the expense of economic services, and, if 
so, whether they reduce the budgetary shares of economic allocations, infras-
tructure, and the like co the point where imbalances occur. That is, given 
the country's ongoing needs for infrastructure and other necessary economic 
services, have defense expenditures skewed the budgetary process away from 
productivity-enhancing activities? 
Budgetary patterns 
The main trends in the country's budgetary shares (see Table 8.1) are as 
follows: 
• There has been a slight increase in the share of the budget allocated to 
defense. This share increased from slightly over one-quarter of the 
budget in 1979 co a little over one-third by 1995. It should be noted 
that this increase has not been linear, but rather reached a peak of over 
35 percent in 1988, only to fall to around 31 percent in 1993 and to 
33.02 percent in 1995. 
• The major expansion in budgetary shares has gone c0 human resources. 
This category represented 8.46 percent of the budget in 1979, 
increasing to nearly 18 percent by 1995. 
• Transport and communications have seen their budgetary shares eroded' 
over the years. These allocations accounted for 12.69 percent of the 
budget in 1980, falling to slightly over 4 percent by 1995. This decline 
has been fairly constant over time, perhaps reflecting the completion of 
the major post-oil-boom wave of capital expenditure projects; 
• Health expenditures do not show a discernible trend, although they 
have increased somewhat, from 4.55 percent in 1979 to 6.78 percent in 
1995. As with defense expenditures, a peak occurred in the late 1980s, 
with health reaching 7 .65 percent of the budget in 1988. 
• Economic resources have declined over time. For the period under 
consideration, they reached a high of 8.54 percent of the budget in 
1980. Since that date they have dropped steadily, reaching 2.57 percent 
by 1995. 
• Infrastructure follows a pattern similar to that of economic resources. A 
high of 4.68 percent was reached in 1980. Subsequently, the share has 
fallen, reaching 0.93 percent in 1995. 
• Municipal services have also declined over time, although again the 
trend has not been strictly linear. Starting at 5 .88 percent of the budget 
in 1979, allocations to the municipalities increased to 8.82 percent in 
1981. Since that time there has been a generally downward trend, with 
the budgetary share reaching 3.26 percent by 1995. 
• Government lending has fallen dramatically over time. In 1979 this 
category received 11.46 percent of the budget. By 1995 the share allo-
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cated for this activity was only 0.32 percent of the budget. The decline 
in this activity was most rapid in the 1980s, with budgetary shares 
falling to 0.42 percent by 1988. 
• The share of resources allocated for local subsidies has fluctuated over 
time, with a high of around 4.65 percent in 1993 and a low of 2.02 
percent in 1980. 
• Administration has seen its share increase over time. From a low of 
14.23 percent in 1982, allocations to this activity reached 29.54 percent 
in 1993, only to fall to 26.48 by 1995. 
Previous studies 
On the surface, budgetary tradeoffs between defense and allocations to 
socioeconomic programs would seem to be straightforward. That is, a given 
budgetary increase in military expenditures will crowd out an equivalent 
amount of all other spending and these programs will be reduced 
according to their proportion of the total. However, recent research has 
shown this view of the budgetary process to be simplistic and not in 
conformance with the manner in which governments often choose to prior-
itize expenditures. 8 
A related issue, and one of significant relevance for the Saudi authorities 
facing austerity programs, is the manner in which austerity-driven 
budgetary cuts are allocated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that officials often 
follow rather ad hoc rules for making large contractions in a short time, 
cutting new rather than ongoing projects, new rather than existing employ-
ment, and materials and travel expenses rather than personnel; and favoring 
ministries that are politically powerful or reducing those that expanded 
most rapidly in the past. 
In the classic study of relative vulnerability to budgetary cuts, Hicks and 
Kubisch examined thirty-seven cases of budgetary reduction. These were 
defined as occurring in countries where real expenditure declined in one or 
more years. Hicks and Kubisch's main findings indicated that the countries 
examined experienced an average decline of 13 percent in real government 
expenditure. Associated with this decline was a contraction of only 5 percent 
in the social sectors (producing a vulnerability index of 0.4). By contrast, the 
index was 0.6 for the administrative/defense sectors and over 1 percent for 
production and infrastructure. In short, the various social sectors were less 
vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, which in turn were 
considerably less vulnerable than production and infrastructure.9 This 
finding was contrary to the prevailing view of the time. 
The fact that social sectors and defense were both relatively protected 
suggests that there were high political costs associated with reducing 
them. Countries appeared to have been more willing to cut spending on 
infrastructure and production, which, of course, is likely to have adverse 
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Table 8.1 Saudi Arabia: budgetary shares(%), 1979-95 
Year Defense Human Tramp()l't and Health Economic 
resources communications resources 
1979 26.12 8.46 11.31 4.55 6.89 
1980 27.27 8.94 12.69 4.88 8.54 
1981 27.70 8.81 11.86 4.60 7.61 
1982 29.64 10.10 10.38 5.43 7.03 
1983 29.06 10.67 9.60 5.23 5.08 
1984 30.73 11.70 8.53 6.21 4.82 
1985 31.98 12.27 7.25 6.45 4.54 
1986 32.86 13.41 7.06 6.67 4.36 
1987 33.97 14.84 6.83 6.95 4.14 
1988 35.47 16.56 6.72 7.65 4.17 
1989 34.04 17.09 6.06 7.57 3.59 
1990 34.27 15.56 4.84 6.81 2.55 
1991 34.27 15.56 4.84 6.81 2.55 
1992 31.81 17.59 4.67 7.52 2.55 
1993 31.32 16.31 4.16 6.92 2.57 
1994 33.47 18.27 4.28 7.04 2.68 
1995 33.02 17.95 4.08 6.78 2.57 
Year Infrastructure Municipal Gowrnment Local subsidies Administration 
services lending 
1979 3.13 5.88 11.46 4.16 18.04 
1980 4.68 7.81 7.71 2.02 15.45 
1981 4.74 8.82 8.34 3.05 14.47 
1982 3.73 8.37 7.46 3.56 14.23 
1983 3.68 7.33 7.69 3.49 18.16 
1984 3.78 6.56 6.73 4.05 16.90 
1985 3.46 5.95 4.65 4.17 19.29 
1986 3.12 5.56 3.58 4.03 19.34 
1987 2.69 5.08 2.25 3.85 19.40 
1988 2.51 4.97 0.42 3.77 17.75 
1989 1.99 3.87 0.01 3.47 22.32 
1990 1.36 3.30 0.59 2.79 27.92 
1991 1.36 3.30 0.59 2.79 27.92 
1992 1.15 3.27 0.36 3.92 27.16 
1993 1.05 3.11 0.36 4.65 29.54 
1994 0.90 3.27 0.33 4.36 25.33 
1995 0.93 3.26 0.32 4.61 26.48 
Soura: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Report, July, 1996. 
implications for longer-term growth but few early direct and immediate 
costs. 
Summing up these findings, Hicks and Kubisch found that when faced 
with difficult choices in reducing public expenditures governments consider 
a wide range of factors, including political and economic costs, present 
versus future consumption, and the potential impact on employment, distri-
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bution, and welfare. Their empirical results suggest that when governments 
in developing countries implement austerity programs they do not apply 
across-the-board reductions in expenditures. Generally, capital expenditures 
are reduced more than recurrent expenditure. Within both capital and 
current budgets, the social and administrative/defense sector appears to be 
relatively protected, while infrastructure and production absorb dispropor-
tionately larger reductions. That the social sector does not appear to be 
highly vulnerable co expenditure reductions in times of austerity was the 
novel finding of that study. · 
Throughout most of the 1980s and into the 1990s Saudi Arabia experi-
enced a period of relative fiscal austerity. Falling oil revenues forced a 
number of significant budgetary cutbacks. Of particular interest is the 
manner in which the authorities sec priorities. Did expenditure on certain 
categories vary systematically with unanticipated changes in revenue? If so, 
which sectors gained and which lose? 
One way of gaining an insight into these issues is to examine the manner 
in which, in light of revenue developments during the fiscal year, the Saudi 
government revised its allocation to the major budgetary categories. Did 
expenditure on certain categories vary systematically with unanticipated 
changes in revenue? If so which sectors gained and which lost? Do these 
patterns provide insights into the manner in which the government estab-
lished budgetary priorities <luring this period? 
While it did not look directly at linkages with defense expenditures, an 
analysis of the 1979-88 period found the following: 
• Human resource development and health and social development alloca-
tions were the only budgetary categories to have their budgetary shares 
increase with expanded, unanticipated deficits. They were also the only 
sectors to have their budgetary shares increase during periods of 
increased actual (realized) budgetary deficits. 
• Human resource development and health did not have their budgetary 
shares expanded with il)creases in expected revenue. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that, because of their high priority, their 
funding levels were assured. Given chis, marginal increases in revenue 
could be safely used by the authorities to fund lower-priority projects. 
• The deficit-related expansion in human capital seems co have come in 
pare at the expense of longer-term investment in economic capacity. 
Specifically, transportation and communications, economic services, and 
infrastructure had their budgetary shares contracted during periods of 
increased unexpected and actual deficics. 10 This finding is consistent 
with that of Hicks and Kubisch, who document the vulnerability of 
capital formation during periods of austerity. 11 
In general, the main findings of chis study confirm the high priority 
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granted co human resource development by the Saudi authorities. Resources 
in this sector have been preserved relative to ocher seccors during che current 
period of austerity. Budgetary cuts have occurred in Saudi Arabia, but 
education has been relatively spared. The long-cerm nature of the commit-
ment by the government to chis sector is also evidenced by the fact that it 
appears co be relatively safe from budgetary cues during periods of 
budgetary deficit. In fact, deficits may owe their size co the authorities' 
commitment to providing adequate funding for these programs. The same 
could be said of health and social expenditures. 
From chis analysis one can conclude that, while defense has retained ics 
leading share of the budget during the recent period of relative fiscal 
austerity, Saudi Arabia does not appear co have fallen into the guns-versus-
education syndrome. In face, che two types of expenditure appear co 
complement each ocher in the minds of the Saudi budgetary authorities. The 
country appears firmly commicced co its responsibility of providing educa-
tional and occupational opportunities co the majority of its citizens. 
Methodology 
To see whether chese conclusions held up, defense was explicitly introduced 
into the analysis the interaction of defense with other budgetary shares, and 
this was assessed by use of cointegration analysis. Specifically, to shed light 
on these issues a vector error-correction model was used. If there is evidence 
of cointegracion between ·two variables - i.e. they move in a similar pattern 
over time - then an error-correction representation of the dynamic relation-
ship between the two variables allows for incorporation of the long-run (or 
low-frequency) movements contained in their cointegrating equation. More 
specifically, if two variables XI and YI are cointegrated, then the current 
change in X1, for example, reflects not only lagged changes in YI but also 
lagged levels of YI. In other words, pare of the short-run change in XI 
reflects an adjustment that brings it into alignment with the trend value of 
YI. 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's Annual Report breaks down che 
government's main expenditure items into defense and security, human 
resource development, transport and communications, economic resource 
development, health and social development, infrastructure development, 
municipal services, government lending institutions, local subsidies, and 
administration. 
To assess the manner in which defense expenditures interact with these 
budgetary items two secs of cointegration analysis were performed: in the 
first set the non-defense shares were set as the dependent variable, with 
defense the independent term; and in the second set defense and non-defense 
were reversed, with defense the dependent variable. Here cointegration is 
identified by the statistical significance of che error-correction coefficient. 
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Specifically, a statistically significant coefficient of an error-correction teem 
indicates that part of the short-term change in the value of the left-hand side 
(dependent) variable reflects an adjustment toward the long-run relationship 
given by the cointegrating relation and thus provides an indirect test of 
cointegration. A related point to note is that when two variables are cointe-
grated Granger causality necessarily exists in at least one direccion. 12 
Results 
Through chis analysis several interesting ·patterns emerge (see Table 8.2): 
Defense and human resources are not cointegrated. That is there is no 
long-run link between their budgetary shares. On the ocher hand, 
increases in either produce a short-run increase in the other. In this 
sense, defense expenditures do not come at the expense of human 
resource development. 
Somewhat surprisingly, no statistically significant patterns were found 
between defense and transport/communications. 
• Health services and defense experience the most complex set of relation-
ships. These budgetary shares are highly cointegrated. Because the 
error-correction term is significant for both defense on health and health 
on defense, it is appetent that the burden on adjustment co correct devi-
ations from the cointegrating relation is borne by both variables. In 
other words, both variables respond to changes in the other. le should be 
noted, however, chat the short-run adjustment of health co changes in 
defense is positive, while the defense share of the budget contracts upon 
increases in health expenditure. In long-run equilibrium however, each 
variable has a positive relationship with the other. 
• Adjustments in economic services occur largely in response to move-
ments in defense expenditures. While chis short-run adjustment may be 
positive, with increased defense resulting in expanded economic 
services, the long-run pattern is clearly negative. The same pattern char-
acterizes che relationship between infrastructure and defense. In 
addition, in both cases it is apparent that movements in economic 
services or infrastructure d~ not affect the share of the budget allocated 
to defense. 
• The share of the budget allocated to municipal services is also negatively 
affected in the long term by expanded defense expenditures. The reverse 
is also the case. In the short run, however, these patterns are not 
predictable enough co be statistically significant. 
• Government allocations to lending institutions suffer at the expense of 
defense expenditures, with negative adjustments co increased defense 
expenditures occurring in the short and long run. 
Table 8.2 Saudi Arabia: cointegration test for long-run defense/budgetary expenditure equilibrium, 1979-95 
Btldget caJegory Emw-correcti,,,. coeffuimt Lang-term coefficient Short-nm impact 
Deperuknt variable Depmdmt wriabk Dependent tlariabk 
non-defense non-defense non-defense 
(defense) (defense) (defense) 
Human resources 
-0.17 -0.59 2.61 0.37 + + 
(-0.97) (-2.18) (1.36) (1.73) 
Transport and communications 
-0.13 -0.34 0.21 -0.10 ins ins 
(-1.97) (-1.48) (0.32) (-0.14) 
Health services 
-1.05 -1.52 0.39 2.49 + 
(-4.60) (-6.07) (6.40) (13.11) 
Economic services 
-0.98 -0.80 .-0.29 -1.14 
(3.37) (-1.45) (-3.69) (-0.88) .+ ins 
lnfrasttucture 
-0.21 -0.28 -0.71 0.50 + ins 
(-3.81) (-1.71) (-4.34) (0.27) 
Municipal services 
-0.29 
-1.39 -0.32 -1.31 ins ins 
(-4.54) (-2.36) (-2.16) (-4.75) 
Lending institutions 
-0.31 -0.11 -1.73 0.43 - ins 
(-4.69) (-0.73) (-5.41) (0.23) 
Subsidies 
-0.13 -1.15 -1.54 4.00 ins 
(-0.25) (-3.11) (-0.22) (3.69) 
.Administration 
-1.09 0.07 0.81 4.47 
(-1.98) (-0.33) (2.45) (0.37) 
Notes: Cocintegration analysis using Pesaran's ADRL estimarion mtthod. Sec Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for the specific computational merhods used. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller rests indicated 1ha1 the budgerary shares all have unir root, i.e. rhey are non-Slationary. 
Brackecs indicace r-statisrics. 
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Increased local subsidies are not affected by allocations to defense. 
However, increases in this budgetary category produce contractions in 
the defense share of the budget. This occurs in both the shore and longer 
term. 
• Finally, defense and public administration are weakly cointegraced, with 
increased defense producing shore-run declines in administration. 
However, in the longer term expanded defense expenditures produce a 
corresponding increase in the share of the budget allocated co adminis-
tration. 
Several of these budgetary links with defense can best be illustrated by 
means of variance decomposition analysis. Here we are interested in the 
percent of the variance of one variable chat is caused by movements in the 
ocher. Because the variables are cointegrated, we can again use the vector 
error-correction form of aucoregression co assess the response of one variable 
to movements in the ocher. 
The case of defense and allocations co the economy can be illustrated by 
applying chis analysis co infrastructure. If we produce an increase in the 
share of the budget allocated co infrastructure, only marginal changes occur 
in defense. In face, after ten periods, past values of defense still explain over 
99 percent of the variance of chat category's budgetary share (see the top of 
Table 8.3). On the ocher hand, after ten periods, increases in defense account 
for nearly 95 percent of the variance in the share of infrastructure in the 
government's budget (see the bottom of Table 8.3). 
In the case of subsidies (see Table 8.4) it is clear chat the government's 
program of local allocations has a great effect on the variance of defense 
expenditures. The reverse is not the case. Finally, and as has been noted, 
health and defense tend co affect each ocher over time, with the variance 
decomposition analysis suggesting (see Table 8. 5) chat chis effect is slightly 
stronger from health to defense than vice versa. 
The general pattern chat emerges from these results is one whereby move-
ments in defense largely control the adjustment of ocher major budgetary 
shares. This movement tends to be positive in the short run for both 
economic and human services. However, in the longer term increased 
defense expenditures largely come at the expense of allocations to the 
economy. Areas such as human resourc~ development and health services do 
not suffer over time from expanded defense budgets. The effect of subsidies 
on defense is interesting in chat it suggests chat some groups in Saudi 
Arabia not only are powerful enough co preserve their payments, but can do 
so over long periods of time and at the expense of allocations co the defense 
sector. 
As noted in Table 8.1, chis conclusion muse be tempered by the fact 
that defense still accounts for about one-third of the budget, while subsi-
dies' share of the budget in 1995 was only 4.6 percent. Still, given the 
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Table 8.3 Variance decomposition tests: defense and infrastructure development 
Ptriod Standard error Defense 
Order of VAR: defense, infrastructure 























Order of VAR: infrastructure, defense 




















































Not1: The method of computation is vtcr:or error-correction auroregression with response 
standard errors calculated through I 00 Monte Carlo repetitions. 
improvement in private investment productivity usually associated with 
infrastructure and other economic services, the negative impact that 
defense has had on allocations must bear some of the responsibility for the 
weakening of the link between private-sector investment and the non-oil 
economy. 
Remittances 
The outflow of private transfers, which includes workers' remittances, is a 
significant contriburor to the kingdom's current payments imbalance. The 
number of overseas residents in the kingdom is estimated at 5-6 million, 
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Table 8.4 Variance decomposition tests: defense and subsidies 
Period Standard error Defmse Subsidies 
Order of VAR: defense, subsidies 
Variance decomposition of defense 
1 0.610945 100.0000 0.000000 
2 0.615594 98.69332 1.306680 
3 0.755057 74.79622 25.20378 
4 1.202869 43.74147 56.25853 
5 1.578888 39.56225 60.43775 
6 1.860501 36.84978 63.15022 
7 2.099617 35.04899 64.95101 
8 2.303546 34.28269 65.71731 
9 2.489484 33.58054 66.41946 
10 2.665479 33.04865 66.95135 
Period Standard error Subsidies Defmse 
Order of VAR: subsidies, defense 
Variance decomposition of subsidies 
1 0.406278 100.0000 0.000000 
2 0.644648 99.98496 0.015037 
3 0.767561 99.93678 0.063218 
4 0.835379 99.88671 0.113289 
5 0.885087 99.84580 0.154199 
6 0.931314 99.81339 0.186610 
7 0.977380 99.78978 0.210221 
8 1.022679 99.77119 0.228810 
9 1.066380 99.75530 0.244700 
10 1.108243 99.74172 0.258280 
Nota: The method of computation is vtctor...crror correction wtoregression with response 
standard errors calculated through 100 Monte Carlo r~titions. 
and in 1994 net private transfers were recorded at $15 billion, compared 
with a current-account deficit of $9. l billion. 13 
Clearly the Saudi authorities are looking closely at ways to reduce the 
hard-currency outflows associated with the large expatriate community. The 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry is conducting a study on 
opening up investment opportunities for expatriates so that some of the 
money now remitted would remain inside the kingdom. The srudy's recom-
mendations include permitting non-Saudis to invest in the stock market -
at present only GCC nationals can invest - and real estate. (Foreigners are 
able to invest in mutual funds offered by the local commercial banks.) 
Although other policies may push up remittances, it is not clear whether 
these changes would result in a sizable reduction in the outflow of expatriate 
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Table 8.5 Variance decomposition tests: defense and health 
Ptriod Standard error Defense Health 
Order of VAR: defense, health 
Variance decomposition of defense 
1 0.949598 100.0000 0.000000 
2 1.118723 99.87266 0.127341 
3 1.223944 89.48703 10.51297 
4 1.280562 84.66337 15.33663 
5 1.318006 85.19339 14.80661 
6 1.348875 85.82303 14.17697 
7 1.366369 85.53605 14.46395 
8 1.378418 84.94050 15.05950 
9 1.386237 84.85715 15.14285 
10 1.392367 84.93275 15.06725 
Period Standard error Defense Health 
Order of VAR: health, defense 
Variance decomposition of health 
1 0.360179 100.0000 0.000000 
2 0.389988 97.95515 2.044851 
3 0.426058 92.94083 7.059167 
4 0.447312 92.60774 7.392260 
5 0.460546 92.69930 7.300704 
6 0.463896 91.50271 8.497292 
7 0.466818 90.40560 9.594396 
8 0.467884 90.17850 9.821503 
9 0.468599 89.90679 10.09321 
10 0.471018 89.32616 10.67384 
Noter: The method of computation is vector·error correction autorcgression with response 
standard errors calculated through 100 Monte Carlo repetitions. 
earnings. Many workers would probably continue to remit a substantial 
proportion of rheir earnings home, as in many cases this is the principal 
source of income for their families and their sole reason for working in Saudi 
Arabia. Moreover, the tightening of some of the regulations on the expa-
triate community is likely to increase the outflow of workers' remittances. 
For example, the newly enforced order that embassy schools cannot enroll 
children beyond the age of 16 is expected to increase remittances, because 
the families of many workers will be forced to return home for their chil-
dren's schooling, thereby requiring workers remaining in the kingdom to 
remit more money to their families. 
The recent increase in remittances is even more striking when compared to 
the pattern of investment in the kingdom (see Table 8.6). As a share of GDP, 
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remittances increased from 3.75 percent in 1971 to slightly over 15 percent by 
1994. Starting out at a slightly higher figure of 4.56 percent in 1971, private 
investment increased to only 11.47 percent by 1994. While showing no 
discernible trend, government investment started the period ( 1971) at 5 .10 
percent of GDP, only to finish at 5.33 percent. These patterns are even more 
dramatic when viewed as shares of non-oil GDP. From a low of 4.87 percent in 
1975, remittances had increased co nearly 24 percent by 1994. In contrast, 
government investment declined from ahigh of 45.75 percent in 1978 co 8.43 
percent in 1994. The share of private investment was much more stable, falling 
fromahighof24.4 percent in 1977to18.19percent in 1994. 
To determine the extent co which remittances interact with investment in 
the kingdom an analysis was undertaken similar to chat performed above on 
budgetary shares. Here we are especially interested in determining whether 
Tablt8.6 Private investment and remittances, 1971-94 
y""" Share of GDP Sharr of non-oil GDP 
Rtmittancu G01Jer11mmt Pri11att Rtmittancu G01Jer11mmt Pri11att i1t11t1tmmt i1t11t1tnmrt i1t11t1tmmt i1t11t1tnmrt 
1971 3.75 5.10 4.56 11.53 17.71 14.05 
1972 3.93 4.89 4.11 13.97 17.41 14.64 
1973 3.86 3.43 2.36 24.84 22.14 15.23 
1974 1.85 5.27 4.77 9.18 26.20 23.71 
1975 1.40 10.63 6.45 4.87 36.96 22.72 
1976 2.12 13.33 8.06 6.42 40.40 24.40 
1977 2.57 17.96 8.14 6.44 45.04 20.41 
1978 4.18 19.65 7.77 9.73 45.72 18.09 
1979 5.08 15.97 6.02 14.97 47.06 17.30 
1980 3.53 20.85 8.94 7.20 42.52 18.24 
1981 3.51 14.08 6.82 9.99 40.09 19.44 
1982 3.50 15.99 8.22 7.07 32.32 16.63 
1983 4.41 13.45 11.10 7.79 23.77 19.64 
1984 5.38 13.18 11.56 8.79 21.55 18.91 
1985 6.04 10.44 11.22 8.90 15.38 16.54 
1986 6.64 9.28 11.81 8.98 12.56 15.99 
1987 6.71 9,95 11.27 9.17 13.59 15.40 
1988 8.55 8.43 11.09 11.73 11.56 15.22 
1989 10.29 8.46 10.48 14.99 12.32 15.27 
1990 10.73 10.84 6.90 17.63 17.81 11.35 
1991 11.65 10.22 8.32 19.25 16.89 13.75 
1992 10.87 6.99 11.85 18.87 12.14 20.57 
1993 13.26 6.76 13.61 21.30 10.87 21.87 
1994 15.06 5.33 11.47 23.86 8.43 18.19 
SONms: Investment: Thirty-Second Annual Report, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Riyadh, 
1996; Remitrances: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, 1997. 
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any long-run patterns exist between remittances and investment. Similarly, 
if these patterns exist, what is the nature of the short-run adjustment process 
that occurs to restore stability after a change in one of the variables. As with 
the budgetary analysis, several patterns emerged. Looking at the impact of 
remittances on investment (see Tables 8.7 and 8.8) and based on the statis-
tical significance of the error-correction term (Ecmt-1), it is apparent14 that 
private investment (both actual and anticipated) and remittances are cointe-
grated - that is, they form a close long-run association (Table 8.7). While 
the long-run pattern is one of increased remittances being associated with 
Table 8. 7 Impact of remittances on investment: full information estimate of error-
correction model 
Exogenous Private Anticipated Total public Public Public non-
variables investment private investment infrastructure infrastructure 
investment investment investment 
Constant 1.92 1.36 4.22 3.00 0.56 
(2.74) (2.18) (5.01) (4.03) (1.08) 
Ecmt-1 
-0.49 -0.37 -0.38 -0.32 -0.51 
(-3.60) (-2.74) (-4.79) (-3.98) (-2.68) 
D 0.24 0.38 




Dt-3 0.57 0.50 
(3.35) (2.65) 
D 
-0.23 -0.11 0.44 -0.16 0.57 
remittances (-1.05) (-0.55) (1.86) (-0.61) (1.71) 
Dt-1 
-0.50 -0.56 0.75 0.63 






Long-run 0.67 0.94 
-1.66 -0.78 -0.42 
coefficient (3.37) (2.92) (-3.83) (-2.22) (-1.72) 
R2 0.47 0.537 0.85 0.76 0.41 
DW 1.66 2.05 2.31 2.02 2.10 
F 4.52 4.06 7.65 6.41 5.67 
Notes: 
Dependent variable = measure of investment; ( ) = t statistic. 
Error-correction parameters and Jong-run coefficients computed using Pesaran's ADRL esti-
mation method. See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for the specific computational methods used. 
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higher levels of private investment, short-run increases in remittances have a 
dampening (the negative sign on the D remittances term) impact on private 
investment. 
In contrast, private investment remittances and government investment 
(both for infrastructure and non-infrastructure) form a long-run negative 
relationship. That is, increases in remittances and public investment form a 
long-run pattern whereby government allocations to capital formation have 
contracted over time with expanded remittances. 
While the pattern of remittances has influenced investment in the 
kingdom, the reverse is not true (see Table 8.8). Both private and public 
investments have had a negligible impact on the long-run pattern of shorter-
run adjustments in the country's remittances. This result is surprising in 
that one might expect that both private and public investment would 
respond to increased domestic economic activity and would thus be associ-
ated with remittances which also reflect that activity. 
A somewhat different pattern was found when both remittances and 
investment were expressed as shares of non-oil GDP (see Table 8.9). The 
Table 8.8 Impact of investment on remittances: full information estimate of 
error-correction model 
Anticipated Total Public Public non-
Exogenous Private private public infrastructure infrastructure 
variables investment investment investment investment investment 
Constant 0.39 -0.11 0.49 0.85 -0.01 
(0.44) (-0.13) (0.62) (1.24) (-0.02) 
Ecmt-1 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03' 0.11 
(0.74) (0.34) (0.48) (0.44) (1.32) 
D investment -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.19 





Long-run 0.56 -1.95 0.71 2.14 -1.66 
coefficient (0.31) (-0.20) (0.26) (0.37) (-1.25) 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.13 
DW 2.63 2.50 2.57 2.59 2.64 
F 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.95 1.31 
Notes: 
Dependent variable = remittances. 
Error-correction parameters and lo~ run coefficients computed using Pesaran's ADRL · 
estimation method. See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for the specific computational 
methods used. 
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share of remittances in non-oil GDP does not form a long-run equilibrium 
with private investment as a share of non-oil GDP. However, increased 
remittances do cause a fairly sharp fall in the private investment/non-oil 
GDP ratio. Again, changes in private investment do not have a corre-
sponding effect on remittances. When expressed as shares of non-oil GDP, 
public investment and remittances move together and form a long-run rela-
tionship. This relationship is negative, with increased remittances reducing 
government investment. All of this adjustment occurs through the error-
correction term. 
Table 8.9 Remittances and investment shares of non-oil GDP: full information 










































































Error-correction parameters and long-run coefficients computed using Pesaran's ADRL estima-
tion method. See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for the specific computational methods used. 
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Conclusions 
For Saudi Arabia, the syndrome of sudden affluence in the 1970s was made 
possible by an economic order based on unearnt income. Specifically, the 
economic link between production and consumption was severed, while the 
government assumed the role of provider, establishing an elaborate welfare 
state and thus securing its role. As long as money was available to lubricate 
the economy, the system worked smoothly for over a decade or so. Even into 
the 1980s, with the transformation of the physical landscape progressing at 
high speed - with the building of an industrial infrastructure, hospitals, and 
utilities - the social and political structures were fixed and secured. Clearly, 
without the constant flow of funds through the elaborate income distribu-
tion networks, most of the status quo is unsustainable. It is no longer 
possible to cover up structural weaknesses and policy inconsistencies. 15 
In sum, the old system has run into diminishing returns and is no longer 
capable of sustaining high rates of economic growth. In particular, the 
breaking of the link between private investment and non-oil GDP appears 
to be the critical structural change occurring in recent years. Clearly, identi-
fication of the precise mechanisms through which the break occurred should 
be a high priority for future research. As for the present, one can only specu-
late as to the causes of this development, although several patterns associated 
with defense expenditures and remittances may provide a partial explana-
tion. In particular, both defense expenditures and remittances appear to have 
reduced the provision of government expenditures - economic services, 
infrastructure, public investment - that ordinarily enhance the productivity 
of private investment. One can conclude that this also carries over to the 
quality of those services. In addition, increased remittances appear to depress 
private-sector investment in the short term. The effects associated with 
remittances and defense expenditures are therefore consistent with the 
observed decline in the effectiveness of private-sector investment in 
expanding non-oil GDP. 
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